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Preemption, Predictability and Progress
in Labor Law
By CLARENCE M. UPDEGRA"*
So law is an authoritative pronouncement, put forth or recognized
by a politically organized society thought of as a legal order, that
given certain defined behavior or a certain defined event, certain
defined action of those who exercise the authority of the legal order
will follow.'
Preemption
AT the tmrn of the century, it appeared that all commerce (like all
Gaul when Caesar wrote) was divided into three parts. These were:
1. Local or intrastate commerce.
2. Interstate commerce: Local aspects.
3. Interstate commerce: National aspects.
The belief, then, was that all matters of local or intrastate com-
merce were exclusively within the control of the affected sovereign
states and would so remain. Matters in the class of local aspects of inter-
state commerce were, if Congress had taken no action in respect to
them, subject to state control until Congress decided otherwise and
took action (preemption). Matters in the area of national aspects of
interstate commerce were beyond the reach of the states and exclu-
sively in the federal area. Silence of Congress implied its conclusion
that these were to be left unregulated by laws; it did not open them to
state control.2
For several decades certain labor relations problems-aspects of
commerce-were apparently considered only under the contracts
clause of the Constitution, and their character as aspects of com-
merce was ignored. Thus legislation against the "yellow dog" contract
was sent down the dram of unconstitutionality when enacted by the
*Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law.
12 PouND, JURISPRuDENCE 167 (1959).
2 Sonneborn v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506 (1922); Houston, E. & W Tex. By. v.
United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913);
New York Cent. R.R. v. Hudson County, 227 U.S. 248 (1912); Leisy v. Hardin, 135
U.S. 100 (1890); Bowman v. Chicago Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1887); Coe v. Errol, 116
U.S. 517 (1886); Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622 (1884); Cooley v. Port Wardens,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
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U.S. Congress8 and by a state.4 However, when the pressure against
the enforcement of such agreements, and against the employer organi-
zations winch had supported and made them effective, gamed decisive
strength, the Norns-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act5 was passed and
signed by President Hoover.6 This statute must be regarded as a
forerunner of the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act),7 and of
the Fair Labor Standards Act,8 and the latter statutes are now sus-
tamed under the commerce clause.
It is the purpose of this writing to study, and not to praise or to
condemn the movement since the turn of the century from what may
be called "stateism" toward "nationalism," and to emphasize the
present extreme need for a thorough statutory clarification and order-
ing process in the labor law area.
Early in this century it was commonplace to say that we were a
nation of dual sovereignty, that the states were sovereign in their
sphere of authority, and that the federal government (one of limited
and delegated powers) was sovereign within, and only within, the
boundaries then assumed fixed by the Constitution in that delegation
of powersY However, even at that time some trends away from
stateism and toward nationalism unmistakably appeared. While The
Minnesota Rate Cases0 upheld the state established freight rates on
intrastate movements, it was implied that this decision would be
reversed if the Interstate Commerce Commission should find that the
intrastate rates involved unjust discrimination against interstate com-
merce. In the later Shreveport Rate Case" it was held that intrastate
rates which adversely affected interstate freight rate adjustments and
which might operate discrnmatorily against shippers in interstate
commerce could be ordered discontinued by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. This appears to be a clear holding that any state es-
tablished or approved intrastate freight rate, or rule, or practice,
which might interfere with interstate commerce, must give way to the
latter. Nationalism was emphasized over stateism.
3Adar v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
4 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1914).
547 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10, 113-15 (1964).
6 See Loeb, Accommodation of the Norrzs-La Guardia Act to other Federal Stat-
utes, 11 LAB. L.J. 473 (1960).
749 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1964).
8 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1964).
9 Cases cited supra note 1, see UPDEG:AFF & McCoy, ARBrrATiON OF LABOR Dis-
rums 54-55 (2d ed. 1961) and cases therein cited.
10230 U.S. 352 (1913).
11 Houston, E. & W Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
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In the early years of this century the executive branch of the gov-
ernment sponsored numerous proposals designed to implement a strong
policy of nationalism. It was desired to end subordination to state
conservatism of politically conceived national objectives. This subord-
ination had based its genesis in the theory that the federal govern-
ment had very limited powers and all the residuum of sovereignty
lay in the states. Recommendations of President Theodore Roosevelt
in this vein subjected him to attack for advocating many things winch
appear to have become an accepted part of political thinking of
today 12
From that time until the present, there has been a general expan-
sion of nationalism at the expense of stateism. True, there have been
judicial reiterations of the limitations upon federal power from time
to time as in Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW 13 In that case there was
emphasis upon the view that while the states had exclusive authority
over wages, hours and working conditions that had to do with such
things as mmmg and processing of goods in factories, movement of
goods in commerce was under the federal authority and that upon
proof there existed an intention to interfere with transportation of
goods in commerce, the federal courts had authority and jurisdiction
to protect interstate commerce by means of punitive damages and the
injunctive process under the Sherman Act.1 4 In 1935 in the case of
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,15 the Supreme Court again
indicated the exclusive authority of each state over wages and hours
22 Frank L. Cobb wrote concerning Theodore Roosevelt, in the U.S. World, Janu-
ary 2, 1912, as follows: "The menace of the Roosevelt campaign does not lie in the
third term tradition, but in the state of mind that could desire four years more of
Roosevelt in the White House, four years more of personal government, four years
more of presidential lawlessness, four years more of autocratic rule, four years more
of executive contempt for Congress, courts and Constitution, four years more of cen-
tralization, four years more of wanton extravagance, four years more of denunciation
and demagogy-rm a state of mind that wants new national aims, that wants federal
interference with every form of human industry and activity, that wants the states
stripped of their powers, that wants the minority deprived of all safeguards against
the tyranny of the majority, and bureaucracy substituted for the Bill of Rights.
"The danger lies not in popular indifference to the third term tradition, but in
popular indifference to the fundamental principles of Liberty upon which this Republic
was established."
13268 U.S. 295 (1925); see Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations,
64 HAnv. L. Rzv. 211 (1950).
1426 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-9 (1964).
15295 U.S. 495 (1935). Here is found emphasis upon the separation of powers.
The court states: "We think that the code-making authority thus conferred is an un-
constitutional delegation of legislative power." Id. at 542. The view taken in Schechter
was soon reiterated in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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of labor of persons employed in internal commerce and processing
of goods within the state.
However, the provisions of the Wagner Act m 1935 apparently
brought about a very marked change in attitude when its constitu-
tionality was sustained in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. NLRB.1"
While this was a 5-to-4 decision, and while it did apparently overrule
Schechter and Carter v. Carter Coal CoY as to commerce, there had
been previous indications that all branches of the federal government,
certainly the White House and the Congress, and in some respects
the Supreme Court, were moving towards nationalism and away from
stateism.
This trend may be seen when the Railway Labor Act of 1926, as
amended in 19 34 ,18 is studied. Moreover, the Norrs-LaGuardia Act
indicated a stiffenmg determination of the federal government to
"take over" farther authority It was apparently felt the national wel-
fare required federal supremacy in the labor area because the de-
centralized and sometimes conflicting views of the several states might
permit, if they did not create, chaos destructive to the national welfare.
The members of the Supreme Court in 1938 were again divided in
their opinions as to the lines of demarcation between state and na-
tional authority when they handed down the decision of Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB.1 9 From this point onward the majority of the
Court has moved steadily in the direction of expansion of federal
authority, at the expense of state authority, by starting from the basic
conclusions in Jones & Laughlin-that Congress had full constitutional
authority to assume complete and exclusive jurisdiction over inter-
state commerce and the production of goods for such commerce. The
Court held in 194620 that the New York State Labor Relations Board
was without authority to deal with matters within the scope of the
National Labor Relations Act.
In declaring that a Pennsylvania statute could not be applied to
prevent strike and picketing pressures for the purposes of organizing
employees of an interstate trucking company, Mr. Justice Jackson
stated that "the policy of the National Labor Relations Act is not to
condemn all picketing but only that ascertained by its prescribed
16301 U.S. 1 (1937).
17298 U.S. 238 (1936).
18 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1964).
19 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
20 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767
(1947). See also Plankmgton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
338 U.S. 953 (1950).
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processes to fall within its prohibitions. Otherwise, it is implicit in the
Act that the public interest is served by freedom of labor to use the
weapon of picketing. For a state to impmge upon the area of labor
combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal
policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or
by methods which the federal Act prohibits."" ' Here is an unmistakable
assumption that the "federal policy" is to be sustained as dominant in
the area of interstate commerce and the production of goods for com-
merce and that the states must not impair the consequences of such
"federal policy"
In Construction Workers v. Laburnum Constr Corp.,22 which was
handed down in the following year, however, the Supreme Court up-
held a Virginia state court common law tort decision indicating that
Congress had not given the National Labor Relations Board exclusive
jurisdiction over the type of action concerned thereto. The Court
apparently approved the thesis that if a state did impose a heavy
damage liability, such liability would strongly inhibit the disputed
conduct in subsequent incidents. To this extent, the decision gave the
state courts co-jurisdiction with the National Labor Relations Board
to determine the legality or illegality of borderline conduct which
might or might not be an unfair labor practice in the opinion of the
board.23 Also, in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Co.24 a state under-
took to enforce its antitrust laws, and the Supreme Court demed the
authority of the state, asserting that even though "no unfair labor
practices were involved, it would not necessarily follow that the State
was free to issue its injunction. If this conduct does not fall within
the prohibition of Section 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act, if may fall within
the protection of Section 7 "25 The court added for emphasis that
"the areas that have been pre-empted by federal authority and thereby
withdrawn from state -power are not susceptible of delimitation by
21 Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 499 (1953). In the very recent
decision of Brotherhood of R.R. Locomotive Eng'rs v. Chicago R.I.&P.R.R., 86 Sup.
Ct. 594 (1966), the majority of the Court, apparently with less reason on the record
for doing so, indicated far more disposition to respect the powers of the states than
was shown in Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938), Bethlehen
Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., supra note 20, or Garner. Justice
Douglas' dissenting opinion appears to be more consistent with the conclusions reached
in those cases (where the Court was interpreting the National Labor Relations Act)
than is that of the majority.
22347 U.S. 656 (1954).
23Id. at 668-69; see id. at 670-71 (dissenting opinion).
24348 U.S. 468 (1955).
251d. at 478-79.
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fixed metes and bounds."( In tins connection, the Court quoted from
Garner v. Teamsters Union: 2 7 "the Labor Management Relations Act
leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling
us how much." 8 Tins penumbral area, it added, "can be rendered pro-
gressively clear only by the course of litigaton."29
In another incident where a lower state court had issued an in-
junction, the Nebraska supreme court stated: "[T]he union shop agree-
ment violates the First Amendment in that it deprives the employees
of their freedom of association and violates the Fifth Amendment in
that it requires the members to pay for many things besides the costs
of collective bargaining."30 The U.S. Supreme Court discussed the
Railway Labor Act and declared, "we pass narrowly on § 2, Eleventh
of the Railway Labor Act. We only hold that the requirement for
financial support for the collective-bargaining agency by all who re-
ceive the benefits of its work is within the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause and does not violate either the First or the Fifth
Amendments." 1 The Nebraska supreme court's decision was reversed.
In the atmosphere of this period, in 1950, the NLRB promulgated
certain criteria to be applied in rejection or acceptance of jurisdiction
of labor disputes. These criteria indicated that only the larger and more
important matters and parties would be heard by the Board. The limit-
mg criteria were amended n 1954 and in 1958.32 State boards and
state officials in some locations assumed that the disputes rejected by
the NLRB were thereby automatically returned to the jurisdiction of
the states, might be treated as "local aspects" of interstate commerce,
and therefore were under concurrent jurisdiction of the states and the
United States. The Supreme Court, however, quite positively indicated
that even though the NLRB was rejecting jurisdiction of a number of
such disputes, they were not returned to the jurisdiction of the states
because the federal government had established a policy, expressed in
the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts,13 vesting exclusive jurisdiction over
such matters in the federal board and the federal courts.34 Hence a
26 Id. at 480.
27346 U.S. 485 (1953).
28 348 U.S. at 480, quoting 346 U.S. at 488.
29 348 U.S. at 480-81, see 346 U.S. at 488.30 Railway Employees Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 230 (1956).
31 Id. at 238.
32 For the Aug. 1, 1959 NLRB Jursdictional Standards, see LRX p. 310a. See
also UPDEGPAFA? & McCoy, op. cit. supra note 9, at 56.
3349 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1964); 61 Stat. 136
(1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-87 (1964).
34 Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
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"no man's land" was created in which certain comparatively minor
labor disputes (though probably extremely important to the parties
concerned) would not be considered by the NLRB and could not be
heard by any other tribunal. This holding was in effect reversed by
section 701 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 19591" which provides a subsection (c) to be added to section 14
of the Taft-Hartley Act providing that states do have jurisdiction to
decide cases which may arise under any section of the National Labor
Relations Act of which the NLRB declines to take jurisdiction. It adds
further that the board shall not refer back to the states any class of
case over which it would have taken jurisdiction as of August 1, 1959.
Tis legislation, however, neither qualifies nor undermines the view
that the nationalistic labor policy excludes state authority except where
the state is permitted to have or retain jurisdiction at the sufferance
of Congress or under "interpretations" of the Supreme Court.
This is nowhere better illustrated than under section 14(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act,36 as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act
which provides that union shops shall be valid in any part of the
United States where not expressly prohibited by the state. Some nine-
teen states have "right to work" laws containing such prohibitions. A
recent and much publicized issue before Congress was whether Con-
gress should repeal section 14(b), thereby striking down all of
the statutes of the nineteen states which have prohibited union shops.
The atmosphere created by the labor preemption decisions had so
pervaded the jurisdictional question that a California court declared
in 1957 that "whatever doubt there may have been as to the
jurisdiction of the State courts following a refusal of the Federal Board
to assume jurisdiction in the first instance was completely set at rest
by the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the Guss, Fairlawn and Garmon cases As long as the facts of a
given case fall within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board, the Congress has completely displaced the power of the courts
of this state to deal with the matter even though those same facts
might otherwise give our courts jurisdiction under the Jurisdictional
Strike Act."37 The California court refused to award damages for losses
3573 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60, 164, 186-87, 401-531 (1964).
3661 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b).
3 7 McKenzie, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machmists, 32 CCH Lab. Cas. If 70,628
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1957) at p. 93,752.
The federal preemption doctrine was, no doubt, a factor m the Califorma Attorney
General's opinion Local Regulation of Professional Strikebreakers, 45 Os. CAL. ArT'Y
GENi. 140-45 (1965).
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brought about by certain picketing and refused to apply the result of
the Laburnum decision. It distinguished the latter by noting that
there the peace of the state was threatened; apparently it was not
under the Califoria facts, for no violence was charged.88
In 1957, and no doubt partly as a result of the same developing
atmosphere of sweeping preemption, the Supreme Court handed
down a revolutionary and far-reaching decision in Textile Workers
Umon v. Lincoln Mills.89 The opinion, by Justice Douglas, held that
section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 194740 (Taft-
Hartley Act) "is more than ]urisdictional-that it authorizes federal
courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these col-
lective bargaining agreements and includes within that federal law
specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances under collec-
tive bargaining agreements." 41 In a later part of the opinion the Justice
states: "We conclude that the substantive law to apply m suits under
§ 301(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy
of our national labor laws."42 He indicated that "federal interpretation
of the federal law will govern, not state law. . But state law, if
compatible with the purpose of Section 301, may be resorted to in
order to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy43
He explained that any state law applied, however, would be absorbed
as federal law and would not be an independent source of private
rights.44 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, commonly esteemed as a great liberal,
had written an opinion only a short time earlier in which he concluded
that section 301 could not be construed as the majority later interpreted
it in Lincoln Mills "even if constitutional questions" could be avoided.4V 5
It is inportant to remember that while the courts have traditionally
38 McKenae, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, supra note 37, at p. 93,754.
Full understanding of the significance of this opinion requires calling to mind both of
the U.S. Supreme Court opinions in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353
U.S. 26 (1957) and 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
For a very good study of Garmon and surviving state powers, see Michelman,
State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74 HAnv. L. REv. 641 (1961).
39 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
4061 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-87 (1964).
4 lTextile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451-52 (1957). (Em-
phasis added.)
42 Id. at 456.
431d. at 457. Here the court cites Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104
(1943).
44 353 U.S. at 456. In this connection he refers to Board of Comn'rs v. United
States, 308 U.S. 343, 351 (1939).
45 Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
348 U.S. 437 (1955).
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"found" or "declared" legal rules, filling the hiatuses of statutes, and
have thus contributed to the growth of law under the aegis of stare
decisis, the federal courts have not previously in this manner openly
asserted authority to join Congress in law "fashionmig" or legislating.
Indeed only a few years earlier, in Schechter, the Court sharply de-
feated a more definite effort of Congress to delegate legislative power
to the executive, relymg on the doctrine of separation of powers as
one basis for holding the National Industrial Recovery Act 6 uncon-
stitutional.47
Preemption Plus Judicial Legislation
Appreciation of the fall impact of the Lincoln Mills opinion re-
quires briefly calling to mind some historical background concerning
arbitration. In the year 1609 Lord Coke had held in Vynior's Case4"
that since it was against public policy that any man who desired to
litigate be excluded from the King's courts and the opportunity to
start an action at law, he could not, even by his promise to arbitrate
a possible future dispute, be debarred from appealing to the courts.
Hence he could refuse to arbitrate, and litigate though he had agreed
not to do so.49
This decision has stood as somewhat of an anomaly through the
years. The arbitration contract has been a prominent example of a
situation in which parties could enter into a solemn, clearly provable
agreement (to arbitrate a future dispute) and yet where either of
them could completely repudiate the agreement (and litigate instead).
Some states have largely reversed the consequences of Vynior's Case
by statute, but it is still effective in certain localities in fields not gov-
erned by the Lincoln Mills decision, which is to say in disputes not in
the labor area. But insofar as contracts to arbitrate labor disputes are
concerned the Supreme Court, through Justice Douglas, has overruled
Lord Coke without the direction of statute.
Some two years before Lincoln Mills, Mr. Justice Frankfurter had
written in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Co., 0
By the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress did not exhaust the full sweep
of legislative power over industrial relations given by the Commerce
Clause. Congress formulated a code whereby it outlawed some
aspects of labor activities and left others free for the operation of
4648 Stat. 195 (1933).
47 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
484 Coke 302, Trinity Term, 7 Jac. 1 (1609).
49 For bnef discussion see UPDEG AFF & McCoy, op. cit. supra note 9, at 5-6.
60348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955).
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economic forces. As to both categories, the areas that have been pre-
empted by federal authority and thereby withdrawn from state power
are not susceptible of delimitation by fixed metes and bounds.
Obvious conflict, actual or potential, leads to easy judicial exclusion
of state action. Such was the situation in Garner v. Teamsters Union.
But as the opinion in that case recalled, the Labor Management
Relations Act "leaves much to the states, though Congress has re-
framed from telling us how much.
This penumbral area can be rendered progressively clear only by
the course of litigation. Regarding the conduct here m controversy,
Congress has sufficiently expressed its purpose to bring it within
federal oversight to exclude state prohibition, even though that with
which the federal law is concerned as a matter of labor relations be
related by the State to the more inclusive area of restraint of trade. 51
In Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp.52 Justice Frankfurter wrote,
But assuming that we would be justified in proceeding further, the
suggestion that the section permits the federal courts to work out
without more a federal code govering collective bargaining contracts
does not free us from difficulties.
Such a task would involve the federal courts in multiplying prob-
lems which could not be solved without disclosing that Congress
never intended to raise them. Application of a body of federal com-
mon law would inevitably lead to one of the following incongruities:
(1) conflict in federal and state court interpretations of collective
bargaining agreements; (2) displacement of state law by federal law
in state courts, not only in actions between union and employer but
in all actions regarding collective bargaining agreement; or (3) ex-
clusion of state court ]urisdiction over these matters. It would also
be necessary to work out a federal code governing the interrelation-
ship between the employee's rights and whatever rights were found
to exist in the union. Moreover, if the general unfolding of such
broad application of federal law were designed, the procedural ob-
]ectives of Congress would have been accomplished without the need
of any special ]urisdictional statute. Federal rights would be in issue,
and, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and Federal Rule 17(b), the suit could
be brought in any district court by or against the union as an entity
The only effect of § 301 would then be to dispense with the require-
ment of amount in controversy and to adopt certain other minor
procedural rules. 3
These words of sound logic describe the basic legal problems sur-
facing in the wake of nationalist preemption. Areas which "have been
pre-empted by federal authority and thereby withdrawn from state
5i Id. at 480-81.
52348 U.S. 437 (1955).
53Id. at 454-55. (Emphasis added.)
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power are not susceptible of delimitation. "'4 These require a "fed-
eral code" governing employees' rights, unions' rights, employers'
rights and the lines between state and federal jurisdiction. It may
be hoped that this enormous and most important area will be at
some early day occupied by a carefully considered statute. In the-
meanwhile it must grow (much as did Topsy) by the piecemeal pro-
cess of stare decisis.
Decisional growth of law by. the judicial "fashionmng" process is
necessarily of an incoherent and fragmentary nature. The decisional
or authoritative words of a court m any case are limited to the matters
properly within the issues of the particular dispute then before the
court. Statements of the court beyond this are dicta and generally
regarded as of little authority Moreover, in reaching its conclusions
the court may not explore the entire area of interests likely to be
affected directly or indirectly by a newly fashioned decisional rule,
but must arrive at its conclusions in the too often dim and limited
light of evidence which is relevant only to the narrow issue then re-
quirmg the court's decision. A legislative body can open up a broad,
general subject and explore it as much as its nature will permit in a
prospective way The judicial light upon the issue is normally of retro-
spective nature and is required to be relevant to the dispute then
pending for decision.55
In the light of this situation the doctrine of federal preemption has
taken over an enormous area of unsurveyed and largely unexplored
jurisdiction. This area seems condemned to remain little understood,
difficult to apply and characterized by conflicting judicial views from
the state and federal courts, the National Labor Relations Board, and
others who perforce must consider and adjust disputes. Surely such is
the prognosis if the Supreme Court, alone, is expected to clarify mat-
ters. The desirable alternative rests with Congress to codify this entire
field as soon as possible by enacting rules which clearly define the
areas of exclusive federal authority and jurisdiction and which return
the balance to the states or to a carefully defined concurrent juris-
diction.
Something of the confusing nature of judicial legislation or law
"fashioning" by the courts can be observed in the majority opinion
in United States v. Hutcheson.56 In that opinion Justice Frankfurter
54348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955).
55 See Updegraff, The Social Sciences & the Law Currwulum, 25 ILL. L. REV.
743, 749 (1931) and authorities cited.
56312 U.S. 219 (1941).
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perceived that the prohibitions of the Sherman Act did not apply to
labor unions or to their activities, though the U.S. Supreme Court had
held in 1908, in the Danbury Hatters' cases, 57 that they did apply
The Hutcheson opinion reached a conclusion against application
of the Sherman Act to labor union activities despite the fact Congress
had left the opposite effect of the Danbury Hatters case undisturbed
for some thirty years. 8 This indicates an unusual tolerance by the
legislative branch if indeed it did not want the Sherman Act so applied.
But more importantly, Hutcheson shows the incompleteness of ]udicial
"fashionmgs," or legislation, when considered with Allen Bradley Co.
v. Local 3, IBEW,"9 which four years later added the qualification that
the Sherman Act does apply in the situation where a labor union is
found to be conspiring with an employer, or group of employers, to
accomplish some result prohibited by the statute.
The following comments concerning recent labor law developments
have been based as much as possible on the very recent decisions. Par-
ticular attention is paid to decisions reached since San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon 0 undertook to make the word and concept
of arguably the shibboleth of determining state jurisdiction. Since
Garmon came down, in 1959, if the issue to be determined is con-
ceived by the court as one which appears arguably to involve section 7
or section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act 6l or in fact arguably
to involve any unfair labor practice, though perhaps a very doubtful,
borderline case, the court should refuse decision on the merits and
5 7 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).58 See Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37
(1927); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
59325 U.S. 791 (1945).
60359 U.S. 236 (1959), 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
61 A few very recent examples are Continental Slip Form Builders, Inc. v. Brother-
hood of Constr. & Gen. Labor, 193 Kan. 459, 408 P.2d 620 (1965); Hutchby v.
District Court, 406 P.2d 70 (Nev. 1965); Retail Clerks v. Christiansen, 52 CCH Lab.
Cas. 7f 51,404 (Wash. 1965). Some courts in parallel situations proceed to decision
apparently at the risk of reversal in some fact situations. See Farmmgton Cleaners,
/Inc. v. Connecticut State Labor Relations Bd., 52 CCH Lab. Cas. 7f 51,395 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1965); Pavillion Nursing Home v. Litto, 47 Misc. 2d 161, 261 N.Y.S.2d
620 (Sup. Ct. 1965), rev'd as to money damages but injunction allowed, 48 Misc.
2d 755, 265 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1965); Braun's Buns v. Pennsylvama Labor Relations Bd.,
52 CCH Lab. Cas. 7f 51,400 (Pa. County Ct. 1965). Compare Buscarello v. Gugliel-
melli, 44 Misc. 2d 1041, 255 N.Y.S.2d 615 (Sup. Ct. 1965). State courts have no
jurisdiction to decide matters arguably within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, Con-
tinental Slip Form Builders v. Brotherhood of Constr. & Gen. Labor, supra. If any
labor relations in dispute are arguably within the ]unsdiction of the NLBB, state
courts should not undertake to control them by injunction. Mitcham v. Ark-La Constr.
Co., 397 S.W.2d 789 (Ark. 1965).
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reject jurisdiction. The National Labor Relations Board must be ac-
corded a prior right and authority to decide matters arguably within
its jurisdiction. Should the Board, too, decline jurisdiction, the matter
goes to "no man's land."
The fact seems to be, however, as a discussion of certain cases shall
demonstrate, that the word arguably is of such uncertain meaning that
it cannot logically be used as a test of jurisdiction. Virtually every case
which goes to any court is arguable, or it would not be in litigation.
When the doctrine of preemption and consequently the application of
the supremacy clause are made to depend upon a word of such cornu-
coplan content, some prompt, thorough congressional study and action
are indicated. When the legislature is interpreted to have left im-
portant disputes and economic interests entirely without remedies
and to have despoiled sovereign states of the police power to protect
the continuity of public utility services, some immediate legislative
action appears vital:
Preemption, Judicial Legislation, and Labor Arbitration
When the Lincoln Mills case came to the Supreme Court there was
no federal statute applicable to general jurisdiction over and the hand-
ling of labor dispute arbitration and there is none today But the "fash-
iomng" of federal law by the Court to fill this need is just as far
reaching as if the Lincoln Mills result had been enacted by Congress.
Without judicial legislation or the "fashioning" of a federal rule or
principle of law and making it retroactive, there was no basis upon
which the Court could say that the parties had agreed to arbitrate and
hence could be required to do so by a federal court decree.
It is not impossible that the attitude of the Supreme Court in rela-
tion to arbitration was in some degree affected by its knowledge that
the lower federal courts and the National Labor Relations Board were
confronted by an extremely great case load of labor problems. One
obvious solution to the dilemma was vastly to expand the scope of
arbitration and thereby reduce the burden falling upon the federal
courts and the NLRB.
Thus to avoid one consequence of nationalist preemption-a tre-
mendous overload on the National Labor Relations Board-the Court
held that agreements to arbitrate labor disputes were specifically en-
forceable under "fashioned" rules of federal common law In this
way the preemption doctrine was extended to provide some means of
deciding the great federal case load of disputes which it caused.
However, as above stated in numerous instances, since Garmon,
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the plaintiffs who sought enforcement of an arbitration agreement
have been refused relief on the basis that the question to be resolved
was arguably a matter requiring decision by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board. Yet the Court, in the so-called "Trilogy Cases,"62 fortified
the view that arbitration of labor disputes should be encouraged and
that the decisional authority of arbitrators should not be diluted or de-
feated by substitution of judges' conclusions for arbitrational awards
when questions of arbitrability are taken into the courts for enforce-
ment or rejection. In United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car
Co.6 3 the Court emphasized the view that arbitration of labor disputes
is favored as a matter of federal policy and that this policy would be
unpaired if the courts undertook to substitute their decisions for the
awards of arbitrators.64 In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co.6 5 the Court declared that arbitration "is the substitute
for industrial strife."66 It went on to assert that "since arbitration of
labor disputes has quite different functions from arbitrations under
an ordinary commercial agreement, the hostility evinced by courts
toward arbitration of commercial agreements has no place here. For
arbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements
is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself."67
In this case the Court also stated that "arbitration is the means of
solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for all
the problems which may arise and to provide for their solution in a
62 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). See Tornngton Corp. v.
Metal Prods. Workers, 347 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1965); Long Island Lumber Co. v.
Martin, 15 N.Y.2d 380, 207 N.E.2d 190, 259 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1965).
63363 U.S. 593 (1960).
64 Id. at 598 (1960). The courts have deferred to a congressionally created Board.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Certain Carriers, 349 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
If the contract does not provide for arbitration, the court has jurisdiction to de-
cide the grievance. International Bhd. of Tel. Workers v. New England Tel. & Tel.
Co., 240 F Supp. 426 (D. Mass. 1965). For ambiguity or defective procedure, awards
should be remanded to the arbitrator. Smith v. Union Carbide Corp., 231 F Supp.
980 (E.D. Tenn. 1964), ret'd, 350 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1965); In re Certain Carriers,
349 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
65363 U.S. 574 (1960). It has been held that a dispute litigable under § 303(b)
of the Taft-Hartley Act must be arbitrated if the parties have so agreed. Old Dutch
Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Union, 243 F Supp. 246 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). It has also
been held that the propriety of a lockout was arbitrable where it was not expressly
excluded. IBEW v. Hearst Corp., 352 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1965); see Brewery Workers
Union v. Adolph Coors Co., 240 F Supp. 279 (D. Colo. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 702
(10th Cir. 1965).
66 363 U.S. at 578.
67 Ibtd.
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way wich will generally accord with the variant needs and desires
of the parties. The processing of disputes through the grievance ma-
chmery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and content are given
to the collective bargaining agreement."6
The following comments on recent cases, taken mainly from the
decisions of the last three or four years, are used to illustrate the recent
volume of court decisions concerning labor disputes and the current
judicial emphasis on the term arguably as a test of preemption, the
judicial "faslioning" of new rules of law, and some uncertainties which
are due to the lack of a complete legislated labor relations code.
Arbitrability
The lower courts apparently are generally following the mandate
of the Supreme Court in holding that under section 301 arbitration will
be enforced unless the arbitration clause clearly excludes the dispute
at issue.
Since Lincoln Mills (1957) and Garmon (1959) the state and fed-
eral courts have considered the matter of requiring arbitration of all
kinds of labor disputes. Whether the courts enforced or enjoined, arbi-
tration turned upon interpretation of the terms of the agreements to
arbitrate, including the grievance provisions and, in some cases, sub-
missions. The primary difference in the handling of labor disputes
since Lincoln Mills and the "Trilogy Cases" is that the parties have
obtained considerable judicial assistance in enforcing arbitration
agreements and thus can rely less on economic pressure in resolving
disputes.(" Several illustrative instances where arbitration was directed"o
68 Id. at 581.
60 The 1965 Proceedings of the Section of Labor Law of the American Bar Ass'n
and the 1965 Report of the Law and Legislation Committee of the National Academy
of Arbitrators indicate the great numbers of arbitration and injunction questions in
actions in the state and federal courts in recent years. This writer has the privilege of
being a member of some of the committees which submitted such reports, and he has
derived much assistance from them in the preparation of parts of the present article.
See Flintkote Co. v. Textile Workers Umon, 243 F Supp. 205 (D.NJ. 1965);
Long Island Lumber Co. v. Martin, 15 N.Y.2d 380, 207 N.E.2d 190, N.Y.S.2d 142
(1965); Powers v. Poch, 21 App. Div. 2d 858, 250 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1964). See also
Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. International Longshoremens Ass'n, 243 F Supp.
140 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Pure Milk Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 50
CCH Lab. Cas. IT 51,181 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1964).
70 United Steelworkers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 413 Pa. 358, 196 A.2d 857
(1964) (contracting out maintenance painting); General Warehousemen Umon v.
American Hardware Supply Co., 329 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1964) (warehouse opera-
tions moved to another county; employees demed jobs at new location); United
Steelworkers v. General Elec. Co., 327 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1964) (arbitrator could
determine whether job change made by employer was permissible under the contract,
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appear below as do somewhere arbitration was demed.7
Courts now, however, require very clear language to exclude a
dispute from arbitration, and they are likely to order arbitration if
the subject is arguably within the arbitration or grievance provisions
of the labor agreement.72 If the clause relied on to exclude the issue
from arbitration is sufficiently definite, it must be given such effect.73
This follows from the fact that the nght to arbitrate, if it is to exist,
must be created by the terms of the contract. Matters normally ex-
clusively managerial may be submitted to arbitration only if the pro-
visions are broad enough to include them. A general exclusion of
"management prerogatives" from arbitration excludes those matters
not covered in the labor agreement which are customarily decided
by management on a unilateral basis.74
though not empowered to change wage rates); Newspaper Guild v. Tonawanda Pub-
lishing Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 211, 245 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1964) (employer required
to arbitrate omission of Christmas bonus); Thompson v. Elliot Precision Block Co.,
233 Cal. App. 2d 761, 43 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1965) (refusal to rehire); Los Angeles
Paper Bag Co. v. Printing Specialties & Paper Products Union, 345 F.2d 757 (9th
Cir. 1965) (disciplinary action); Belock Instrument Corp. v. Local 479, Int'l Umon
of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 49 CCH Lab. Cas. f 51,061 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964),
aff'd, 252 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1964) (plant removal); United Steelworkers v. G. F Wright
Co., 51 CCH Lab. Cas. 7 19,534 (D. Mass. 1964), aff'd, 346 F.2d 928 (1st Cir. 1965)
(discharge of strikers and contract termination by employer because of strike); Local
156, United Packinghouse Workers v. Du Quoin Packing Co., 337 F.2d 419 (7th Cir.
1964) (court stated that transfer of work here considered was "arguably" within
coverage of agreement to arbitrate); United Brick & Clay Workers v. Green Fire
Brick Co., 343 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1965) (overtime pay for Saturday work); Builders'
Ass'n of Kansas City v. Greater Kansas City Laborers Dist. Council of Int'l Hod Car-
ners, 326 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1964) (dispute over completion of health and welfare
plan).
71 Boeing Airplane Co. v. UAW, 349 F.2d 413 (3rd Cir. 1965) (non-distribution
of Christmas turkeys); Neth v. General Elec. Co., 399 P.2d 314 (Wash. 1965) (dis-
charge of non-umon employee).
72 Industrial Scientists v. Shell Oil Co., 52 CCH Lab. Cas. ft 16,548 (9th Cir. 1965);
Desert Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. General Sales Drivers Union, 335 F.2d 198 (9th Cir.
1964) (wage arbitration excluded but overtime compensation could be arbitrated);
Marble Products Co. v. Local 155, United Stone Workers, 335 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1964)
(strike discharges excluded from arbitration, but award that the conduct was not a
strike was sustained); see Empire State Hairdressers' Assn. v. Rizzuto, 55 CCH Lab.
Cas. f 51,394 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); In re Alpha Amp. Corp., 52 CCH Lab. Cas.
It 51,405 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); Interstate Bakeries Corp. v. Bakery, Cracker, Pie &
Yeast Wagon Drivers Union, 58 IMI. App. 2d 485, 208 N.E.2d 397 (1965).
Procedural arbitrability questions are quite generally sent to the arbitrator. General
Dynamics Corp. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 242 F Supp. 617 (D. Conn. 1965);
Wooleyhan Transp. Co. v. Highway Truckdnvers Union, 243 F Supp. 321 (E.D. Pa.
1965); Brewery Workers Union v. Adolph Coors Co., 240 F Supp. 279 (D. Colo.
1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1965).
73Camden Indus. Co. v. Carpenters Union, 353 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1965); Com-
munication Workers v. New York Tel. Co., 327 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1964).
74Local 12298, UMW v. Bridgeport Gas Co., 328 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1964) (arbi-
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Most courts seem to agree that arbitrability or exclusion of griev-
ances from solution by arbitration must be controlled strictly by the
terms of the contract. At times, in the process of interpretation of
the words of the contract to determine its scope, evidence of bargain-
mg history and "past practice" may be considered. Such questions are
normally decided by the arbitrator rather than the court. Very much,
however, depends on the exact phrasing of the labor agreement on
matters of grievances, grievance procedure, and arbitration. 75
Failure to Perform Contract Conditions
The common law has long been familiar with the doctrine that if
one party to a contract containing an arbitration clause should refuse
to perform obligations which are contractual conditions, this refusal
automatically releases the other party from the obligation to arbitrate.76
However, the Supreme Court has now "fashioned" federal law to the
end that a union's breach of a no-strike clause does not result in for-
feiture of its right to arbitration. The Court has sometimes expressed
itself otherwise, but it now appears to take the view that the arbitration
procedures and the no-strike clauses are not so closely related that
breach of the latter clauses will necessarily terminate arbitrational
rights.7 Since that view has been asserted, a federal district court has
indicated that a material violation of a labor contract may enable the
complying party to repudiate all the other provisions of the contract
and yet enforce the arbitrational clause.78 It has been held that bilateral
tration required concerning posting and filling a vacated job-strong dissent); Boeing
Co. v. UAW, 234 F Supp. 404 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
75 See Strauss v. Silvercup Bakers, Inc., 353 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1965); Communica-
tion Workers v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 337 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1964) (remand
with directions to consider bargaining history and to decide arbitrability of dispute);
Fitchburg Paper Co. v. MacDonald, 242 F Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1965) (whether two
or more issues should be submitted to arbitrator held to be for arbitrator's decision);
Local 24, IBEW v. Bloom & Co., 242 F Supp. 421 (D. Md. 1965); Smith v. Truck-
drivers Union, 23 App. Div. 2d 944, 259 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1965).
76See UPDEGRAFF & McCoy, AiwrrnATION OF LAnoR DispuTEs, 119-31 (2d ed.
1961) and cases cited therein.
7 7 Local 721, United Packmghouse Food & Allied Workers v. Needham Packing
Co., 376 U.S. 247 (1964). See also Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery
and Confectionery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962) (union's answer denied that there
had been a strike); Scazitti Co. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 351
F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1965); United Steelworkers v. American Intl Aluminum Corp.,
334 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1964); UMW v. Roncco, 232 F Supp. 865 (D. Wyo. 1964)
(union called strike; later required to arbitrate before suing).
78 Local Joint Executive Bd., Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Nationwide Down-
towner Motor Inns, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Mo. 1964). See also Reynolds Elec.
& Eng'r Co. v. Carpenters Union, 401 P.2d 60 (Nev. 1965). An employer who failed
to give a discharged employee a written statement of the reason for his discharge, in
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breaches of conditions do not necessarily nullify arbitrational obliga-
tions, and that they are enforcible even though the contract has
expired.7 9
Preemption, Judicial Law Making, and the Individual
In the case of Smith v. Evenng News Ass'n,80 the Supreme Court
held that individual employees have the right to maintain suits under
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Two years later,
in 1964, it held in Humphrey v. Moore8 1 that individual employees
can maintain an action to enjoin enforcement of a joint umon-employer
agreement if it violates the umon's duty of fair representation.
The courts have generally emphasized the long-established rule
that the individual claimant must exhaust contractual grievance and
intraumon remedial procedures before bringing suit in court for estab-
lishment of his rights.82 It has been held that a claimant's failure to
comply with the time limitations prescribed by grievance procedure
will be fatal to his daims even if he did not know about them.8 3
breach of contract, cannot require that the employee exhaust the contract remedies
including arbitration before bringing a court action. Andrews v. Victor Metal Prods.
Corp., 394 S.W.2d 123 (Ark. 1965).
79 Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. United Garment Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 195
(8th Cir. 1964) (both parties in default of performance).
80 371 U.S. 195 (1962). The opinion relies heavily on a broad interpretation of
§ 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act and Lincoln Mills. The action was held not preempted
under the Garmon rule as "arguably" a matter for NLRB decision. See Martin v. Ethyl
Corp., 341 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1965) (husband may maintain action for wife in com-
munity property state).
81375 U.S. 335 (1964). But the court held there was no violation of fair repre-
sentation; the Lincoln Mills opinion was explained and followed.
82 Desrosiers v. American Cyanamid Co., 51 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 19,500 (D. Conn.
1965); Verbiscus v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 238 F Supp. 848 (E.D. Mich.
1964) (union officer required to file complaint with Secretary of Labor). Even a suit
brought by the Secretary of Labor to set aside a union election at the request of a
defeated candidate was dismissed because of failure to show that the party had
exhausted all remedies available under the union constitution. Wirtz v. United Steel-
workers, 52 CCH Lab. Cas. ir 16,815 (N.D. Ala. 1965). See also Boeing Airplane Co.
v. UAW, 349 F.2d 412 (3rd Cir. 1965) (employer who could not initiate arbitration
not barred from court for failure to do so); Smith v. General Elec. Co., 63 Wash. 2d
624, 388 P.2d 550 (1964) (aggrieved party not union member but bound to follow
grievance procedure). Exhaustion of unduly restricted remedies is not required. Thom-
men v. Consolidated Freightways, 234 F Supp. 472 (D. Ore. 1964) (contract pro-
cedure created only union organizational remedies, hence did not bar action by in-
dividual claimant).
88But timeliness is an issue to be decided by the arbitrator. The court should
not stay arbitration when this is in question, but should refer the matter to arbitration.
Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. American Guild of Musical Artists, 52 CCH Lab. Cas.
ff 51,398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); Smith v. General Elec. Co., supra note 82; Kennedy
v. Bell Tel. Co., supra note 82.
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The burden is upon the individual employee to show that the union
failed to represent hun properly, and in such case he must proceed
within union rules even in cases where the union completely omitted
to process his grievance.8 4 The burden is similarly upon the individual
when he charges that the union and the employer have entered into a
settlement unfavorable to his rights.85 It has been held generally that
the individual employee, not being technically a party to the collec-
tively bargained agreement under which the arbitration was carried
out, has no right or standing to attack the award in court.86 However,
the individual employee's duty to exhaust remedies, and the other
procedural rules which usually restrict his rights, are likely to be
excused where he can show that the union was guilty of a breach of
duty of fair representation or that the umon and the employer have
entered into an improper agreement to limit or destroy his rights.87
S4 Kennedy v. UAW, 52 CCH Lab. Cas. f 16,578 (1965). But see Archibald v.
Local 57, International Umon of Operating Eng'rs, 52 CCH Lab. Cas. If 16,516 (D.R.I.
1964).85 Zeaner v. Highway Truck Drivers Umon, 234 F Supp. 901 (E.D. Pa. 1964)
(individual bound by union's adverse action if taken in good faith and in fair repre-
sentation); Cortez v. California Motor Express Co., 226 Cal. App. 2d 257, 38 Cal. Rptr.
29 (1964) (decision of joint labor-management committee that employee be dropped
for disability binding in absence of showing of unfair representation). See Sherman,
Union's Duty of Fair Representation and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 MnN. L.
REv. 771 (1965).
86 Corbin v. Friendly Frost Stores, Inc., 49 CCH Lab. Cas. I 51,090 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1964) (petitioner had fully participated in hearing and both parties had agreed
on the issue); Pernce v. Burns Bros., 50 CCH Lab. Cas. If 51,187 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1964) (court held plaintiff not proper party to seek nullification of award; also
rejected jurisdiction on ground that there was "arguably" a umon unfair labor practice
question involved and hence there would be federal preemption); New York Joint
Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Rogers Peet Co., 50 CCH Lab. Cas. If 51,144
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) (member not formal "party" to arbitration contract).
It is for the arbitrator to decide whether the employee has lost his right to have his
grievance considered in arbitration. Kociuba v. Stubnitz Greene Corp., 52 CCH Lab.
Cas. If 51,388 (Pa. C.P. 1964).
87 Fuller v. Highway Truck Drivers Umon, 233 F Supp. 115 (E.D. Pa. 1964)
(employees may maintain suit where unfair representation alleged); Tully v. Fred
Olson Motor Serv. Co., 50 CCH Lab. Cas. If 19,198 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1964) (matter
"arguably" concerned unfair labor practice, hence federal preemption controlled and
six-months limitation on filing unfair labor practices charges applied by state court).
Courts require evidence of unfair representation such as bad faith, arbitrary action
or fraud by the umon to excuse a member from being bound by the contracted duty to
arbitrate and to allow recovery against the union or the employer. See Kennedy v.
BeL Tel. Co., 52 CCH Lab. Cas. If 16,639 (S.D. Cal. 1965); Deacon v. International
Umon of Operating Eng'rs, 52 CCH Lab. Cas. I 16,605 (S.D. Cal. 1965); Desrosiers v.
American Cyananid Co., 51 CCH Lab. Cas. I 19,500 (D. Conn. 1965) (union shown
to have refused to represent claimant); Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car
Porters, 243 F. Supp. 261 (E.D.S.C. 1965) (member claimed union unfairly failed to
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It is clearly one of the duties of umons to enforce the personal rights
of their members under the labor agreements and under section 301.8
This means that the umons' responsibilities in the area of preserving
employees' rights may be much greater than they were before Lncoln
Mills.
Court Jurisdiction and Labor Arbitration
In the case of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston89 a small firm,
Interscience Publishers, was party to a labor agreement which included
an arbitration clause. This little company merged with the large
Wiley & Sons publishing firm. The latter did not expressly assume the
Interscience labor contract, and denied it was subject to any obliga-
tions thereunder. The Court held that the question of whether the
duty to arbitrate survived the merger was a matter for judicial deci-
sion rather than for arbitrational award. It sustained the umon's
contention that the obligation to arbitrate grievances survived the
merger. The Court indicated that the collectively bargained agreement
was more than an ordinary contract. Labor contracts, it was said, called
"into being a new common law-the common law of a particular in-
dustry or of a particular plant." The Court also denied the Wiley Com-
pany's contention that the union had failed to comply with the first
steps of the grievance procedure, and ruled that this dispute should
be decided by the arbitrator, since it had to do with procedural
factors set up in the arbitration provisions of the agreement.
Since the Wiley decision, the courts have several times indicated
that the purchaser of a going business may be bound to honor an arbi-
tration clause which was binding upon the previous owner in a col-
protect his semority rights). Compare Addeo v. Dairymen's League, 262 N.Y.S.2d 771,
47 Misc. 2d 426 (1965) (allegation of conspiracy against plaintiff gives state court
jurisdiction even though "arguably" unfair labor practice charge appears).
88 However, where a member has failed to act with diligence on his own behalf
he will not be heard to charge his umon for the consequences of his neglect. Steen v.
UAW, 52 CCH Lab. Cas. ir 16,588 (E.D. Mich. 1965). See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal
Corp., 235 F Supp. 183 (S.D. Ind. 1964) (state statute barred recovery); United
Steelworkers v. Copperweld Steel Co., 230 F Supp. 383 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
89 376 U.S. 543 (1964) (hearing may be required under appropriate circumstances
to determine whether new owner is bound by predecessor's contract to arbitrate);
Drivers Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 138 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1965);
see McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 247 F Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Hart
Sales Corp. v. Lubliner, 50 CCH Lab. Cas ff 19,157 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
For an interesting study of Wiley and its implications, see AmincAxi BAR Ass'N,
1965 PnoCEEoNnGs OF rH SECTON ON LABon RELATIONs LAw 300 et. seq.
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lectively bargained agreement.90 Thus new fields for possible litigation
and arbitration of labor problems seem to have been opened.
Jurisdictions-Federal, State, and Concurrent
In the Smith case,91 the preemption doctrine was interpreted to
mean that the state courts have jurisdiction over suits by individual
employees against their employers and that section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, creating federal jurisdiction for suits
between unions and employers without regard to amount or citizen-
ship, does not exclude the mdividual's right of action. This is held
to be true even though the conduct involved might also be an unfair
labor practice or "arguably" so. 9 2
In the case of Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,93 the Court dis-
cussed concurrent jurisdiction of arbitrators and courts over disputes
arising from collective bargaining. In that litigation it held that the
availability of a section 10(k) 94 proceeding (to settle work rights
or jurisdiction) before the NLRB would not bar a union from com-
pelling arbitration of a work assignment dispute where the same
was within the terms of the collective bargain. The federal and state
courts have several times declared that the fact that a grievance is
within, or "arguably" within, the jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board will not prevent either arbitration or enforcement of an
arbitrational award.95 It has been recognized that proceedings before
the NLRB and before an arbitrator proceed on the bases of different
rights and issues, but both rest squarely upon the preemption doctrine.
The Board proceedings were provided by statute to safeguard the
00 United Steelworkers v. Reliance Umversal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964)
(new owner bound to arbitrate to same extent as predecessor); McGuire v. Humble
Oil Co., 247 F Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
91Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
92 Fuller v. Highway Truck Drivers Union, 233 F Supp. 115 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
933 75 U.S. 261 (1964).
9461 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 160 (1964), directing the NLRB to hear and
decide jurisdictional disputes.
95 United Steelworkers v. American Intl Aluminum Corp., 334 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.
1964) (employer had repudiated contract charging slowdown). Cf. Todd Shipyards
Corp. v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 344 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1965), where
the question was whether a clause in the contract was proper and legal work pro-
tection or an illegal "hot cargo" clause. See also Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Em-
ployees v. Trailways, Inc., 232 F Supp. 608 (D. Mass. 1964) (duty to arbitrate exists
though matter in dispute may be unfair labor practice); Westchester, Putnam & So.
Dutchess Employers Material Yards Ass'n v. Operating Eng'rs, 52 CCH Lab. Cas.
r 51,360 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965).
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employees' statutory rights. Arbitration rights are of contractual crea-
tion, now resting upon section 301 as interpreted by Lincoln Mills, for
the enforcement of rights created by the labor agreements. They exist
concurrently with statutory rights arising from unfair labor practices."
In one situation a trial examiner had found that a umon with a union
shop agreement had violated the National Labor Relations Act by
excluding replacement employees lured during a strike from becoming
members. On these facts a district court granted the employer a stay
of arbitration, holding that the findings of the trial examiner should
not be ignored.T Similarly it was held that when a representation
question was pending before the National Labor Relations Board, arbi-
tration should not be ordered until the Board could act since the
arbitrator's award would necessarily have to be consistent with the
Board's determination. 8
In another case a federal district court enjoined a umon from arbi-
trating99 a grievance to enforce a hot-cargo clause. The court reached
the conclusion that the matter was not arbitrable because the National
Labor Relations Board might hold the contract clause itself to be
invalid. The court ignored the fact that this result could also have
been reached by the arbitrator. The court emphasized the fact that
this was not a suit under section 301(a) but one under section 10100
wherein the Board was seeking to enjoin arbitration.
One rather unusual recent case involved a refusal by a federal
district court to remand to a state court a suit to enjoin arbitration.
The employer contended that because of duress no valid collective
bargaming agreement was made and that the federal court was, there-
fore, without jurisdiction. That court held that it had jurisdiction under
section 301 since a contract had been signed. It also indicated that
96 Todd Slhpyards Corp. v. Marine and Shipbuilding Workers, 344 F.2d 107 (2d
Cir. 1965). See also Local 499, IBEW v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 49 CCH Lab. Gas.
It 18,818 (S.D. Iowa 1964). Litigants of labor dispute questions m federal courts are
not required to meet either the diversity requirement or the amount in controversy
requirement. See Martin v. Ethyl Corp., 341 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1965). But diversity of
citizenship continues to be required for removal of a suit against an unincorporated
union from a state court to a federal court, and such unions may be sued m any states
m which they have business locations. United Steelworkers v. Bouligny, Inc., 382
U.S. 145 (1965).97 Kentile, Inc. v. United Rubber Workers, 228 F Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
On the exercise of judicial discretion, compare Omaha Beef Co. v. Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, 51 CCH Lab. Cas. It 19,769 (D. Conn. 1965).
98 B D Markets, Inc. v. Meat Cutters, 51 CCH Lab. Gas. If 19,499 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
99 McLeod v. American Fed'n of Television Artists, 234 F Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y.
1964), aff'd, 351 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1965).
100 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 160 (1964).
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the Connecticut State Mediation Board, which was named as arbitrator
in the purported contract was not a proper party to the removal pro-
ceedings, and therefore the federal court retained jurisdiction. The
probable next step in this regard might well be a decision as to whether
the conduct of which the employer complained was such an unfair
labor practice as to invalidate the contract; this could arguably put
the matter into the hands of the National Labor Relations Board.10i
In another case a federal circuit court considered a dispute between
two unions concerning violation of an non-raiding agreement. The
National Labor Relations Board had certified the respective units
to be represented. An interpretation of the Board's ruling was made
by an arbitrator and enforced by the court.10 2
A New York supreme court case recently held that an NLRB deci-
sion that an employer removed his plant in good faith, and for sound
economic reasons after a contract expiration, would bar the union from
obtaining arbitration of issues inconsistent with such findings.10 3 A
strike to force concession of an arbitrable grievance is a contract
violation even in the absence of an express no-strike clause. State
and federal courts share jurisdiction in these matters under section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act.104 It is established that the
NLRB does not commit error by dismissing a complaint upon being
advised the matter at issue has been decided by an arbitrator.'0 5
In an unusually interesting case, the Board was overruled after it
ordered reinstatement of two employees. A trial examiner found that
the employer had used a "wildcat" work stoppage led by the two dis-
charged women as a false pretext for their discharge. In rejecting the
101 Omaha Beef Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 51 CCH Lab. Gas. 7 19,769
(D. Conn. 1965).
102 International Blid. of Firemen v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 338 F.2d
176 (5th Cir. 1964). See Pernice v. Burns Bros., 50 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 51,187 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1964).
103 Blue Bird Knitwear Co. v. Livingston, 49 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 51,070 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1964) (whether there remained arbitrable issues after decision of NLRB left to
arbitrator).
104 In cases of concurrent jurisdiction the state courts are required to apply federal
law. Local 174, Teamsters Umon v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). See
Independent Oil Workers v. Mobil Oil Co., 85 NJ. Super. 453, 205 A.2d 78 (1965)
(federal courts defer to state courts on matters primarily concerning state laws).
105 Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1964) (employee not given notice
of the "arbitration proceeding" but made no claim of irregularity or fraud). After
arbitration procedure has been initiated the NLRB has discretionary authority to issue
a complaint or defer the same until an award has been made. NLRB v. Thor Power
Tool Co., 351 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1965); and see Kracoff v. Retail Clerks, 244 F Supp.
38 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
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Board's conclusion the court relied upon an arbitrator's award up-
holding the discharges. 106
The Wisconsin supreme court recently held that termination by
retirement of thirty-eight employees between the ages of sixty and
sixty-five with substantial pensions as agreed by their labor union was
not arguably an unfair labor practice so as to exclude it from juns-
diction. The court stated that the union had bargained for the labor
agreement and that the terminations were consistent with it. The court
noted that the retirements did not violate the Wisconsin Fair Employ-
ment Act and that the pension plan was approved by the United States
Internal Revenue Service as complying with its regulations. 0 7 Obvi-
ously, however, had one or more of the men filed a charge with the
General Counsel of the NLRLB alleging a conspiracy to remove them
from employment, or had they charged unfair representation before
the NLRB, as they appear to have charged before the Wisconsin In-
dustrial Commission, the Board could properly have taken Jurisdiction.
The NLRB asserts its authority to act on an unfair labor practice
complaint even when the same matter falls within the contractual
grievance procedure which leads to arbitration. 08 The Board will
refuse to defer to arbitration in situations where the employer has
refused to perform a statutory duty to furnish information to the union
and has resisted arbitration.0 9 The Board's policy seems to be to honor
a "fair and regular" award made in grievance procedure."10 It will not,
however, give force and effect to the disposition of a grievance indi-
cated to have been made "final" at a step in the grievance procedure
prior to formal and proper arbitration even though the grievance was
"abandoned" by failure to pursue it within the contracted time limi-
tation."'
Enforcement of Awards
The overwhelming majority of arbitrators' awards are promptly
performed by the parties. When they do get into the courts, however,
the judicial conclusion is usually that the arbitrators have not ex-
106 Raytheon Co. v. NLRB, 326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964) (court stated NLRB trial
examiner made findings against employer's good faith on a bare assumption).
107 Walker Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n of Wis., 135 N.W.2d 307 (Wis. 1965).
Cf. Westchester, Putnam and So. Ass'n v. Operating Eng'rs, 52 CCH Lab. Cas. ir 51,360
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965).
108 Thor Power Tool Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1379 (1964). This conclusion of the board
was sustained, NLRB v. Thor Power Tool Co., 351 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1965).
109 Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 110 (1964).
110 Modern Motor Express, 149 N.L.R.B. 147 (1964).
'iI Electric Motors and Specialties, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 125 (1964).
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ceeded the authority given them in the agreement to arbitrate or in
the submission.1 1 2 Back-pay awards sometimes have been reviewed.
Generally speaking, arbitrators' decisions on this matter have been sus-
tamed unless the court concluded that under the contract terms such
an issue was not intended to be arbitrated or that it was expressly
excluded by some restriction in the contract."3
In some instances, however, courts have reviewed the merits of
the disputes arbitrated and have concluded the arbitrators have gone
beyond their authority1 4 The award of reinstatement with back pay
was held in one case to exceed the arbitrator's authority In that case
the court pointed out that the pay issue was not submitted to arbitra-
tion and that it was not included in the terms of the labor agreement."5
It has also been held by a state court that a contract providing arbi-
trators' awards were to be effective as of the time when made excluded
power to make a retroactive wage increaseii6
Where a change of conditions caused an award to be ambiguous
it was sent back to the arbitrator for clarification." 7 In another matter
112In re Certain Carriers, 247 F Supp. 176 (D.D.C. 1965); American Bosch Arma
Corp. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, 243 F Supp. 493 (N.D. Miss. 1965).
(Award of pay enforced for day other than that claimed in grievance); Atchison,
T. & S.F Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 229 Cal. App. 2d 607, 40 Cal. Rptr.
489 (1964) (award of extra pay for coupling air hose on cars for other crews within
usage or "law of the shop"). Compare Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz. Ry., 336 F.2d
543 (9th Cir. 1964), where it was held that the National Railroad Adjustment Board
had no authority to create a Medical Board since the parties did not agree to arbitra-
tion which was in fact umposed by statute.
l1 3 In Hodges v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 238 F Supp. 425 (N.D. Ga. 1964),
award of reinstatement with back pay was held not enforcible against an employer
which had been held liable to the employee for a permanent, disqualifying m]ury.
See Oil Workers v. Mobil Oil Co., 350 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1965). See also IBEW v.
Bally Case & Cooler, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
114International Ass'n of Machinists v. Jeffrey Galion Co., 350 F.2d 512 (6th Cir.
1965) (award in excess of arbitrator's authorized scope of action denied enforcement).
An award was enforced in part in H. K. Porter Co. v. United Saw Workers, 333 F.2d
596 (3d Cir. 1964). See also Polycast Corp. v. Local 8-102, Oil Workers, 52 CCH Lab.
Cas. 7 51,383 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965).
115 Kansas City Luggage Workers v. Neevel Luggage Mfg. Co., 325 F.2d 992 (Sth
Cir. 1964); Appleton v. Judy Bond, Inc., 49 CCH Lab. Cas. It 51,085 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1964) (court vacated award as exceeding authority given arbitrator). See also Burt
Bldg. Materials Corp. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 24 App. Div. 2d 897, 264
N.Y.S.2d 993 (1965).
116 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. New York Lumber Trade Ass'n, 49 CCH
Lab. Cas. ff 51,073 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964). In this case the arbitrator apparently had
exceeded his authority in several parts of his award. The court modified it by eliminat-
ing its excessive features and directed it be performed as so modified.
17 Kennedy v. Continental Transp. Lines, Inc., 230 F Supp. 760 (W.D. Pa.
1964). The question was whether the arbitrator awarded "identical work" or "identical
runs" and a definition was required by the court.
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in which diverse interpretations caused collateral disputes, the awards
were sent back to the arbitrators for re-study and re-wording."8 In
yet another case the court indicated belief that the intent of the arbi-
trator was clear and unambiguous, but the court furnished some sup-
plemental terms further to clarify the award.",9
However, where the contract is of uncertain meaning, but the
award of the arbitrator based on the contract is clear, it is not proper
for the court, by reconstruing the contract, to alter the arbitrator's
result..2
0
Preemption-States' Authority-Protection of Operations
It has long been established that some union pressure tactics, such
as sit-down strikes, slowdowns, the calling of union meetings during
working hours, and practices involving violence, are not "protected"
under the National Labor Relations Act. The process of examining
all the various types of union activities which have appeared (and
which may yet appear), and concluding whether each one or the man-
ner or objective of its execution is "protected" or not, is likely to
extend well into the future. As far as past experience and litigation
have clarified this scene, however, some generalizations may be
ventured.
Despite the preemption doctrine and the "law fashioning" by
the Supreme Court under the Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills deci-
sion, the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act' 2 ' and similar state enact-
ments appear to have continued validity to the extent that they do
not invade present federal rules. The Wisconsin courts had held that
a union which caused several intermittent work stoppages was guilty
of an unfair labor practice under the Act which prohibited any inter-
ference with production except leaving the premises of the employer
118 Transport Workers v. Philadelphia Trans. Co., 228 F Supp. 423 (E.D. Pa.
1964). The dispute was as to an award which did not specify wich automobile trucks
were to be "gassed" by the employees concerned. See also UAW v. General Motors
Corp., 52 CCH Lab. Cas. If 16,549 (E.D. Mich. 1965). Here the award was remanded
to the arbitrator for clarification because it left open a possible conflict with the NLRB
in a work assignment situation. In another case a matter was sent back for hearing
because it was contended there had been no hearing before the first purported award.
Private Sanitation Uion v. Carratu, 51 CCH Lab. Cas. II 51,295 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965).
119UAW v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 151 Conn. 650, 201 A.2d 656 (1964). See also
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. New York Lumber Trade Ass'n, 49 CCH Lab. Cas.
ff 51,073 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964). But where the court "modified" the award into a
virtual reversal of it, the court was reversed. Kollsman Inst. Corp. v. Cnvelli, 52 CCH
Lab. Cas. ff 51,414 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965).
120 Avco Corp. v. Mitchell, 336 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1964).
121Wis. Stat. 1947, c. 111, § 111.06(2).
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in an orderly manner for the purpose of going on strike. The Supreme
Court affirmed this holding in International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin
Labor Relations Bd. 22 In reaching this conclusion the Court observed
that the state act did not forbid any conduct permitted under the
federal statutes. In contrast the NLBB can forbid a strike when its
purpose is one of those made illegal by the federal statute, but it has
not been given power to forbid a work stoppage because of illegal
method.
Under the New York act, however, union conduct was apparently
deemed by a state court to be "protected" when it had caused eight
noon-day work stoppages in two months, thus disrupting the normal
activities of the employer, a dining-club. This characterization as
"protected" resulted in a narrow holding by the New York State Labor
Relations Board that the act of the employer in discharging some
men for this conduct was discriminatory and hence an unfair labor
practice.123
In a fairly recent case it was held by the state court that the Wis-
consin Fair Employment Act was not totally preempted by any federal
statute and that the Wisconsin court has jurisdiction to enforce it. 2 4
On the other hand an action for damages and for injunctive relief
against an allegedly closed union under the California statute was
demed by the state court on the ground of federal preemption; the
court held the matter to be "arguably" one for NLRB decision. 25
The Supreme Court has held that federal statutes do not license
unionized employees to harass the employer by "sit-down strikes"
nor to defy the authority of the employer to manage ins business
while remaining in his service.' 2 Nor may the NLRB reinstate men
who have been terminated for advocating a slowdown. 27 Under the
122336 U.S. 245 (1949). But this result was held inapplicable where there was a
single stoppage during working hours. UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
336 U.S. 245 (1949); Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. v. Algoma Plywood &
Veneer Co., 252 Wis. 549, 32 N.W.2d 417 (1948), aff'd, 336 U.S. 301 (1949), and see
Smith, Putting the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act into Effect, 46 MARQ. L. REv. 263
(1963).
123 New York State Labor Relations Bd. v. Union Club, 295 N.Y. 917, 68 N.E.2d
29 (1946). But umon's right to meet with commissioners of marine department was
lost by work stoppage and picketing since this conduct shows bad faith. Donaldson
v. Brown, 24 App. Div. 2d 714, 263 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1965).
224 Walker Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 27 Wis. 2d 669, 135 N.W.2d 307 (1965).
125 Directors Guild of America, Inc. v. Superior Court, 64 A.C. 42, 48 Cal. Rptr.
710, 409 P.2d 943 (1966).
12 6 NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
127 Superior Engraving Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 930 (1951); Wyman, Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 153 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1946).
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guidance of these last decisions the NLRB apparently must now follow
the view that the states, authorized state agencies, and arbitrators share
authority to prevent interference with production by employee groups
engaging in harassment other than those protected actions which are
taken for a declared and legitimate objective. 28
In 1950 the Third Circuit held that a single more or less sponta-
neous work stoppage would not justify discharges or penalties for
those who participated in it or led it since it was concluded by the court
to be a suitable, concerted activity for the purpose of collective bar-
gaming and protected by section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act.' 2 9
On the other hand, it has long been held that refusal to work
scheduled overtime is not "protected." However, such conduct appar-
ently does not relieve the employer from the statutorily imposed
obligation to bargain collectively 130
A brief study of the unfair labor practice disputes decided by
the NLRB in recent years under section 8(b) (as recorded in the
NLRB Digest) conflrms the thought that the majority of the practices
involved may also be in contention in cases where damages, injunc-
tions, or decrees directing arbitration are sought in state courts under
state statutes. Many will, therefore, be "arguably" within the juris-
diction of the NLRB. Hence certain state courts will hold that they
do not have jurisdiction, and others will undertake to decide the dis-
putes which come to them concerning interference with production.
Some of these latter decisions will be reversed.
The 1959 amendments to section 8(b) (4) of the National Labor
Relations Act, forbidding unions to cause any person to refuse to
handle the products of any other producer and providing against
"hot-cargo" contracts and secondary boycotts, have widened the po-
tential scope of federal action against unfair labor practices by unions.
It would seem that this widening is likely to create more situations in
which it may be "arguable" that the state will be without jurisdiction
because of the need for prior NLRB decision. The confusion which
128 See NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 846 (8th Cir. 1946); The
Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 Hnv. L. REmv. 282-92 (1964), and cases therein cited;
cf. Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950); Phelps-Dodge Corp. 101 N.L.RB. 360
(1952). Here it was held that the employer was not under a duty to bargain during
a slowdown.
329 NLRB v. Kennametal, Inc., 182 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1950).
130 Superior Engraving Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 930 (1951); NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 147 F.2d 262 (6th
Cir. 1945); E. G. Conn, Ltd. v. NLRB, 108 F.2d 390 (1st Cir. 1939). See also Dow
Chemical Co., 152 N.L.R.B. No. 122 (1965).
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may well result from this, and the expense and delay, is thought to be
well illustrated by a very recent case. In Hanna Mining Co. v. District
2, Marine Eng'rs Ass'n, 3 1 the NLRB disclanned jurisdiction because
supervisors (who were involved in allegedly unlawful picketing)
were not covered under the federal labor laws; the Wisconsin su-
preme court then refused to act because it deemed the power of the
state was "arguably" preempted by federal law; the United States
Supreme Court returned the matter to the state court with the ruling
that the conduct of the uion was neither protected nor prohibited
by federal laws since its entire membership consisted of supervisors.
What now? Though the power of the state court was declared by the
Supreme Court not to be preempted, the question was certainly one
"arguably" for the NLRB. (A good number of responsible men must
have thought so.) In such a case, Garmon indicates there remains
only the limbo of "no man's land."
Preemption-States' Authority-Picketing
While picketing seems to have long been subject to state and even
local authority,13 2 peaceful picketing, deemed to be within the pro-
tection of the National Labor Relations Act, may not be unduly prohib-
ited by a state court even though such picketing is contrary to state
law 113 In Garmon the Supreme Court held that the Califorma
state court was preempted of jurisdiction to enjoin peaceful picketing
or to assess damages against a union. The reason was that such pick-
eting was "arguably" within the protection of sections 7 or 8 of the
National Labor Relations Act, and hence the character of the picketing
must be determined by the NLRB. The majority indicated that if the
Board decided that the activity was neither protected nor prohibited,
or even if the Board declined jurisdiction, the states were not free
to regulate such matters. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in the minority opm-
ion, repeated a statement which he had made in a former decision,
that the statutory definition of what authority had been taken from
13186 Sup. Ct. 327 (1965).
13 2 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301
U.S. 468 (1937).
133 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Garner v.
Teamsters Umon, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
In one recent matter a federal court declined jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement
of a city ordinance restricting distribution of handbills and requiring a license to
distribute them. It required a showing of exhaustion of state court remedies before
application of federal court aid. This view puts the dilemma of what to do with the
"arguable" cases directly into the hands of the state courts in the first instance. United
Steelworkers v. Bagwell, 239 F. Supp. 626 (W.D. N.C. 1965).
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the states was "of Delphic nature" and required to be made concrete
by "the process of litigating elucidation.""3 4 A concurring opinion
indicated that four members of the Court would not agree that the
states should be powerless when the union activities are "neither pro-
tected nor prohibited" by the federal act. If such was to be the law,
they stated, "then indeed state power to redress wrongful acts m
the labor field will be reduced to the vamshing point."3 5 It may now
be suggested, in view of numerous recent cases in which state courts
have refused to act because a question was "arguably" for decision by
the NLRB, that the vaishing point has been reached. This inquiry
seems appropriate: Is the much-sought exclusive power of the NLRB
to make primary decisions upon labor disputes of suicient importance
to balance this constriction of the police powers of the sovereign states?
Should not Congress re-examine this entire subject and remove it
from the tortuously slow, though possibly finally able, "process of liti-
gating elucidation"? Should not state courts, at least in all extreme
cases, disorderly or peaceful, have jurisdiction to protect the interests
of all parties unless and until the NLRB acts or indicates it will not
do so?
If violence becomes an element it seems to be the present rule
that the state has authority to award damages and to protect the public
peace.136 Though it has been made clear that the federal courts will
generally protect peaceful picketing from unreasonable or extreme
state restrictions, 37 it was held in the case of Carpenters & Joiners
'34 359 U.S. at 241. "Delphic nature" imputes obscurity and ambiguity. Ancient
learning, from which the term derives (as well Mr. Justice Frankfurter must have
known) had the Delphic oracles uttered by a priestess (Pythia) who was seated on a
tripod above a chasm from which arose foul and noxious vapors. Inspired by these
vapors she uttered the confused-sounding oracles which required especially trained
prophets for their interpretation or translation.
All can agree the federal labor laws, taken as a whole today, are obscure and
ambiguous oracles as the learned Justice indicated. Whether they originated in a
mephitic atmosphere or otherwise, they do need clarification. However, legislation
rather than "litigating elucidation" would obviously get the task done sooner and better.
The previous use of this simile was in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales,
356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958).
135 359 U.S. at 254.
186 See cases cited supra note 95. See also UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958);
UAW v. Wisconsin Labor Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956); United Constr. Workers
v. Laburnumn Constr. Co., 347 U.S. 656 (1954); Kohn v. Wagner, 52 CCH Lab. Cas.
I[ 51,354 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); K & B Foam Products Co. v. Wagner, 52 CCH Lab.
Cas. gt 51,362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965).
137 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); International Ladies Garment
Workers Union v. Hendrix, 52 CCH Lab. Cas. I 51,375 (D. Ala. 1965). But recent
decisions show reluctance of state courts to act where the matter is arguably a labor
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Union v. Ritter's Cafe' that specific state statutes which undertake
to restrict peaceful picketing to the area m dispute do not involve the
use of powers preempted by the federal government. The state law of
Texas was upheld. However, the non-statutory policy of the State
of Illinois to prohibit peaceful non-employee (or "stranger") picketing
was denied enforcement because the Supreme Court concluded that
elimination of such pickets would unduly restrict "free communica-
tion."3 0 Moreover, while peaceful picketing has repeatedly been held
immune from injunctions, the immunity terminates where the pick-
eting is preceded by a "context of violence."' 40
In the case of Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 4' the Su-
preme Court upheld the validity of state-imposed picketing bans,
apparently on the theory that a state policy against monopolistic
dominance of business should take precedence over freedom of speech.
Injunctions imposed under state laws against peaceful picketing have
been sustained where the purpose of the picketing was the attain-
ment of objectives not sanctioned by state policy Representative cases
upholding state injunctions have involved picketing to impose a
system of racial quota employment, 42 to compel self-employed persons
to work only during union working hours, 43 to obtain a union shop
contract regardless of the employees' wishes,'44 and to compel an em-
ployer to put only union members on Ins payroll in violation of a
state nght-to-work law ' 45
dispute within the federally preempted area of authority. Operating Eng'rs v. Meekins,
Inc., 175 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1965); Baltimore Bldg. Trades Council v. Maryland Port
Authority, 238 Md. 232, 208 A.2d 564 (1965).
An Illinois court reversed a trial court which had granted an injunction against
picketing a construction ]ob and causing secondary boycott activity, on the ground the
matter arguably required an NLRB decision. Larson & Sons, Inc. v. Radio & Television
Broadcast Eng'rs, 52 CCH Lab. II 16,842 (IIl. 1965). See also Smith v. Pittsburgh
Gage & Supply Co., 245 F Supp. 864 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
138315 U.S. 722 (1942). See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
139AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 326 (1941).
One recent state decision, apparently relying in part on Vogt, declared broadly
that peaceful picketing may be enjoined if its purpose is to defeat a reasonable state
policy. Delaware River and Bay Authority v. Int'l Org. of Masters, Mates and Pilots,
211 A.2d 789, 795 (N.J. 1965).
140 Milk Wagon Dnvers Union v. Meadowmoor Dames, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
141336 U.S. 490 (1949).
142 Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950). For a recent case of similar
nature see Petition of Curtis, 52 CCH Lab. Cas. 11 51,351 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
143 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
'44 Building Service Employees v. Gazzain, 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
145 Local 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192
(1953.)
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Nevertheless, in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Co.,146 the Su-
preme Court set aside a state court injunction which involved the
same anti-monopoly act under which it had allowed protection by
injunction against picketing in the Giboney case. In Weber the court
stated the "principal question 147 to be whether the state court had
jurisdiction to enjoin the union's conduct or whether its jurisdiction
had been preempted by the authority given to the NLRLB. The answer,
the court indicated, must depend upon whether the objective of the
picketing, and hence the picketing itself, was "protected" under fed-
eral statutes in the opinion of the NLRB. In such an event, "the state
cannot be heard to say that it is enjoining that conduct for reasons
other than those having to do with labor relations."148 The Court then
reserved to the NLRB the primary right to decide whether the activity
was "protected" or not with the implication that in any case of
doubt no state injunction could be allowed regardless of what state
policy might appear, to state officials (nearest the scene), to be in
jeopardy
The Weber opinion then goes on to state that Congress did not
exhaust, by the Taft-Hartley Act, the total of legislative power over
industrial relations given to the federal government by the commerce
clause. The opinion adds that the statute outlawed some aspects of
labor activities and not others but preempted plenary power over
both aspects, and that "obvious conflict, actual or potential, leads to
easy exclusion of state action."x1 9
To one who seeks to ascertain the boundaries of the states'
jurisdiction in respect to picketing, and who reads the Giboney (by
Black, J.) and the Weber (by Frankfurter, J.) opinions to make
comparison, it is difficult to perceive that labor relations were not
concerned in Giboney. The court there states that "the sole mimediate
object of the publicizing adjacent to the premises of Empire, as well
as the other activities of the appellants and their allies, was to compel
Empire to agree to stop selling ice to nonumon peddlers. In this
situation, the injunction did no more than enjoin an offense against
Missouri law, a felony" 850 It concludes that constitutional freedom
of speech does not provide immunity for "speech or writing used as
an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid crminal statute." 15'
146 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
147 348 U.S. at 473.
148 Id. at 480.
149 Id. at 490.
150 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
151-Id. at 498.
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The later Weber opinion does not explain its apparent conclusion
that there was no labor relations question in Giboney which should
have been reserved for decision by the NLRB. In fact the Weber
opinion does not mention Giboney save in a short terminal footnote in
which the reader is informed that the case "was concerned solely with
whether the state's injunction against picketing violated the Fourteenth
Amendment."152 Was there then no labor relations question in the
right of a union and union pickets to stop the sales of ice to nonumon
peddlers or in their manner of so doing in violation of a valid state
criminal statute?
Perhaps the most disturbing part of the Weber opinion is the
penultimate paragraph in which, with possibly comforting intent,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter informs the states' representatives and other
readers:
We realize that it is not easy for a state court to decide, merely
on the basis of a complaint and answer, whether the subject matter
is the concern exclusively of the federal Board and withdrawn from
the State. This is particularly true in a case like this where the rulings
of the Board are not wholly consistent on the meaning of the sections
outlawing "unfair labor practices," and where the area of free 'con-
certed activities" has not been clearly bounded. But where the mov-
ing party itself alleges unfair labor practices, where the facts reason-
ably bring controversy within the sections prohibiting these practices,
and where the conduct, if not prohibited by the federal Act, may be
reasonably deemed to come within the protection afforded by that
Act, the state court must decline jurisdiction in deference to the tin-
bunal which Congress has selected for determining such issues in
the first instance.'53
It seems to be sound to generalize, then, that states may enjoin:
mass picketing, threats of bodily injury or property damage, and
obstruction of public ways, gates of factories, and employees' homes.
They may also enjoin recurrent unannounced work stoppages and
probably any picketing intended to implement them. Milk Wagon
Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc. 5 4 expressly authorizes
state injunctions against peaceful picketing after a "context of
violence" has been created, and state statutes may reasonably limit
picketing within an area of dispute.'55 But neither state common law
152348 U.S. at 481. While Weber bnefly dismisses Giboney as not dealing with
a labor relations issue, Vogt and several cases decided between Weber and Vogt appear
to rely much on that opinion.
'53348 U.S. at 481. (Emphasis added.)
154312 U.S. 287 (1941).
155 Carpenters Union v. Bitter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
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nor non-statutory policy may be enforced to exclude peaceful picketing
by non-employees, ("strangers"), in the absence of a dispute between
an employer and his employees. 156 It must also be recognized that if
in any of these cases, normally within the "states' authority," a con-
tention, or perhaps even a mere suggestion, appears that an unfair
labor practice may "arguably" be involved, the court may conclude,
as in Weber, that even though state protection of the same state policy
was approved in a prior case, it will now be struck down. It may
conclude that the primary privilege of the NLRB to decide some
unfair labor concept must be preserved, even though such concept has
been heretofore unknown and hence unannounced. The fact that the
Board's opinions are "not wholly consistent on the meaning" of the
statutes (as stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the quotation above)
creates a situation which demands prompt congressional clarification.
This need is particularly acute since the Board may refuse to accept
jurisdiction and refuse to issue complaints, while at the same time state
courts are frequently refusing to take substantive action upon disputes
which they conclude (rightly or wrongly) are "arguably" for decision
by the Board.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc., 157 sought
to illuminate this area (perhaps to explain his words quoted above
from the Weber opinion) In Vogt he explained that a series of then
recent cases had established that a "State, in enforcing some public
policy, whether of its criminal or its civil law, and whether announced
by its legislature or its courts, could constitutionally enjoin peaceful
156 AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
157 354 U.S. 284 (1957). Some courts have refused to enjoin picketing to obtain
union security contracts on the basis that their jurisdiction is restricted to consideration
only of the results of execution of such agreements and putting them into effect.
Kitchens v. Doe, 172 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1965); Painters Umon v. Joyce Floors, Inc.,
398 P.2d 245 (Nev. 1965). See also Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963)
where the holding ignores the fact that under a right-to-work law and § 14(b) of
Taft-Hartley, the picketing could be putting pressure on the employer to enter into an
agreement which would be a clear violation of both state and federal law. It does
not seem to be necessary to make a concession which is itself wrong as the only
means of testing an obviously unlawful demand. The legal test could be had in an
appeal from an injunction which prima facie would be sound and that procedure would
maintain matters in status quo until a final ]udgment could be had. If the demanded
clause is of doubtful validity in its nature, the injunction should not issue.
A number of recent cases, without stressing the matter of state policy involved,
have held that if a umon activity in question appears not to be arguably within the
jurisdiction of the NLRB, it may be enjoined by the state courts. See Operating
Eng'rs v. Meekins, Inc., 175 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1960). See also Ex parte Ford, 236
F Supp. 831 (E.D. Mo. 1964); Dugdale Constr. Co. v. Operative Plasterers Ass'n, 135
N.W.2d 656 (Iowa 1965).
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picketing aimed at preventing effectuation of that policy ""' It is
difficult to reconcile this statement with the facts and his statements
m Weber, particularly when the antecedent Giboney opinion is called
to mind. Three dissenting justices in Vogt seem to approve Giboney,
but with unusual emphasis they state that after the Vogt opinion
"state courts and state legislatures are free to decide whether to permit
or suppress any particular picket line for any reason other than a
blanket policy against all picketing."'59 Neither the expressed hope
of the Vogt majority that the law be clarified nor the feared result
forecast by the minority seem to have come about in the decisions m
the eight years since the publication of Vogt.
The Garmon opinions, delivered on April 20, 1959, do not discuss
Vogt, which was then only two years old. They give no explanation
as to whether Garmon is to restrict or limit whatever state authority
is inferrable from Vogt. It is submitted that such an explanation would
have been an excellent place for some of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
"litigating elucidation" since he wrote the majority opinion in both
cases and was also author of Weber (which went unmentioned in
Vogt).
It is to be noted that the majority and the minority opimons in
Garmon both indicated that as a result of the majority view the state
courts are deprived of jurisdiction whenever it appears that a matter
is "arguably" one requiring primary NLRB determination. Thus they
recognize that another "no man's land" is created. Even if the Board,
after consideration, does not accept jurisdiction, if the matter was
"arguably" one for it to decide the states have been preempted of
authority There exists, then, on this theory, no competent jurisdiction
for decision and no remedy, though a clearly defined state policy may
be defeated by the challenged activity
There may be a few instances since Vogt and Garmon where state
courts have felt more confident in issuing labor injunctions, but the
recent Hanna Mining case, 6' mentioned above to indicate the in-
utility of the word "arguably" as a test of jurisdiction, may be used
again to show the perplexity into which its attempted use leads. It
will be recalled that the Board declined to issue a complaint because
supervisors are not covered by the NLRA. The employer next sought
relief from the Wisconsin court. The state supreme court declined
15s 354 U.S. at 293.
259 Id. at 297 (dissenting opnion).
160 Hanna Mimng Co. v. District 2, Manne Eng'rs Ass'n, 86 Sup. Ct. 327 (1965).
See p. 501 supra.
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to take jurisdiction in the belief that the question was "arguably"
within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, and this despite the fact that the
Board had already refused to take jurisdiction of the dispute. The Wis-
consin court concluded that the Board's refusal did not amount to a
"determination."' 6' The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
matter to the Wisconsin court, with emphasis that there was no pre-
emption in the case. Both the state court, in its apparent error, and the
Supreme Court in reversing, cited and apparently approved Vogt. The
concurring opinion suggests that in many such future cases, the parties
may have to visit the Supreme Court to learn whether the "aspects" of
the picketing for which an injunction is sought are "primary" or "sec-
ondary," since the states may regulate only the former and have
been "preempted as to the latter."162
Aside from picketing, the present perplexities clouding the limits
of state and federal jurisdiction are illustrated by a recent action of
a Texas state court in refusing to accept jurisdiction of a suit by union
members against their union for causing their discharge in that the
union ordered a plant shut down contrary to the employer's orders.'63
The Texas court concluded that it was "reasonably arguable" that the
issue in question was within the jurisdiction of the NLRB. Hence the
court decided it had no jurisdiction. Another state court, one judge
dissenting, accepted jurisdiction over a libel suit brought by cam-
paigners for one union against another union involved in an NLRB
representation election. 64 Contrarily, and further illustrating the
present unpredictability of application of law in this area, another
state court held it could not decide a damage suit by a member against
his own union for failure to prosecute a grievance for hm.165 The
16123 Wis. 2d 435, 127 N.W.2d 393 (1963).
162 86 Sup. Ct. at 335 (concurring opinion).
163 International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Casida, 376 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 955 (1965).
164 Meyer v. Joint Council 53, Teamsters Union, 416 Pa. 401, 206 A.2d 382 (1965).
The dissenting judge indicated that, in his opinion, all doubtful tort actions should be
rejected as within the scope of primary NLRB authority. In Lin v. United Plant
Guard Workers, 86 Sup. Ct. 657 (1966) a district court had held against entertaining
a common law libel suit brought by an employer against a union organizer on the
ground the matter was arguably within the jurisdiction of the NLBB. The Supreme
Court, by a margin of 5 to 4, reversed and indicated that the tort libel action is one
of the matters which the National Labor Relations Act left "to the states" when
Congress "refrained from telling how much" else was omitted from federal preemption.
The dissenters were vigorous in their condemnation, with Mr. Justice Black asserting,
"this new Court-made law tosses a monkey wrench into the collective bargaining
machinery Congress has set up to try to settle labor disputes " Id. at 665.
May one not ask if this is not in fact a court-made partial repeal of court-made
law set up under Lincoln Mills?
165 Owens v. Vaca, 51 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 19,613 (Mo. App. 1965).
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writer of the majority opinion was apparently yielding (while still
in doubt) to what he felt was the somewhat obscure result of the
Supreme Court's conclusions. A dissenting judge stated,
While this matter of federal preemption in the field of labor relations
remains cloudy, I do not believe that a state court should deny its
own jurisdiction where it is unable to point out a logical argument
showing that the fact situation is "arguably" within the jurisdiction
of the National Labor Relations Board as constituting activity which
is protected or prohibited by sections 7 and 8 of the Act.166
There appears to have been no substantial judicial treatment of the
question as to whether states have power to enjoin organizational
and recognition picketing in violation of section 8(b) (7) of the
National Labor Relations Act.167 It seems to be a fair assumption, how-
ever, that litigants will normally seek a federal court ruling on such
matters, as being "arguably" within the scope of preempted powers,
though a state injunction would likely be sustained in a "context of
violence" or in any situation so clearly an unfair labor practice that
recourse to the NLRB for decision would seem to be obviously un-
necessary 16 8
Preemption-States' Authority-Protection of
Continuity of Public Utility Services
In 1953 Mr. Archibald Cox, who later became Solicitor General of
the United States, and who has long been recognized as one of the
leading experts in the field of labor law, testified before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, as follows:
Second, it would seem clear to me that the States should have
power to deal with strikes in gas and electric utilities and in other
situations that may create a serious threat and immnent threat to
public health and safety
Today apparently the States do not have that power. There is a
decision by the Supreme Court of the United States invalidating the
Wisconsin law providing for compulsory arbitration in public utili-
ties. Some of the other States, like Massachusetts, Senator Kennedy,
have a slightly different law and we have continued to apply them,
iOU Id. at 33,494 (dissenting opinion). (Emphasis added.)
i67Pennsylvama state courts refused to enjoin some peaceful picketing at con-
struction sites where the umon's conduct was "arguably" protected or prohibited under
the federal statutes as the NLRB might decide. Seifert & Son, Inc. v. Local 229, IBEW,
52 CCH Lab. Cas. if 16,640 (Pa. C.P. 1965).
108 The Califorma Supreme Court recently vacated an order of a trial court en-
joining picketing. This court indicated it would not assume authority to sustain this
decree in the absence of a showing that the NLRB had specifically declined to accept
jurisdiction. Russell v. IBEW, 64 A.C. 13, 48 Cal. Rptr. 702, 409 P.2d 926 (1966).
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but I think everyone agrees there is a real question whether these
laws would not be invalidated if they were taken to the Supreme
Court. I think that decision should be changed by legislation so that
the States can deal with those true emergencies which are neverthe-
less too local to be handled under the-Federal statute. Somebody
ought to be able to deal with them. 169
A steadfast friend of labor, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissented from
the decision which declared the Wisconsin public-utility-anti-strike
statute ineffective because of federal preemption and stated:
But the careful consideration given to the problem of meeting
nation-wide emergencies and the failure to provide for emergencies
other than those affecting the Nation as a whole do not imply paraly-
sis of State police power. Rather, they imply that the States retain
the power to protect the public interest in emergencies economically
and practically confined within a State. It is not reasonable to impute
to Congress the desire to leave States helpless in meeting local situ-
ations when Congress restricted national intervention to national
emergencies.170
The functions and importance of public utility company services
are too well known to require much comment. This writer some years
ago ventured the following remarks in an article.
It will be recognized that since all public utility properties are
owned and operated for purposes which entitle the utility companies
to take lands of private owners for their use without violating the
"due process" clause, the utility is in the most complete sense dis-
charging a "public service." It is analogous to a branch or department
of the state government. Virtually all of the businesses now referred
to as public utilities are, in one part of the world or another, com-
monly owned and operated by sovereign states, so that in a very real
and correct sense it may be said that the public utlities are to be
identified with government agencies for which they are, in a sense,
substituted. Since they have become monopolies because of their
duty, like that of the Government, to serve all at reasonable rates,
they have reached a point of development where it becomes neces-
sary to sustain their unfailing operation, ]ust as government itself is
sustained. This is to secure protection of the health, public safety,
and general welfare of the population or general public. Indeed, the
public health, morals, safety, and general welfare (so zealously
guarded by the sovereign police power) would be much more
169 Heanngs on S. 2650 Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Wel-
fare, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 2412 (1953).
17o Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 406-07 (1951); cf. Harrs v. Battle, 348 U.S.
803 (1954).
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quickly npaired by discontinuance of certain public utility services
than by temporary suspension of many governmental agencies 171
Supporting his bill to restore to the states the power to protect the
continuity of public utility services, Senator Spessard L. Holland
testified on May 28, 1959 in the following words:
It is difficult for me to understand how anyone could conceive
of Congress intending to preempt a field of such vital importance to
the general public-which had been entered by many local and state
governments-without providing a substitute for local procedure,
under an Act which contained in its declaration of policy the state-
ment " and above all recognize under law that neither party has
any right in its relations with any other to engage in acts or practices
which would jeopardize the public health, safety or interest," and
also the words " and to protect the rights of the public in con-
nection with labor disputes affecting commerce." In my opinion, the
majority opinion of the Supreme Court went completely contrary to
the expressed declaration of policy in the Act, without specific lan-
guage in the body of the Act to justify such a departure, and by this
interpretation the Supreme Court accomplished in part what the Act
was trying to prevent, by declaring void all protective state laws
dealing with strikes in public utilities and thereby permitting the
public health and safety to be placed in jeopardy during public
utility strikes.'72
The bill in support of which Senator Holland testified did not pass,
nor has any act of Congress since that date alleviated the situation.
The states are still without authority to protect continuity of service
of privately owned public utilities. Cities and towns continue to be
in danger of sudden and complete discontinuance of electric, gas,
water, telephone and city transportation services in case a union and
a public utility management should encounter unusual difficulty in
negotiating a labor agreement. In fact the situation has been com-
pounded by a later decision of the Supreme Court holding a Missouri
statute to be ineffective because of the federal preemption of authority
over labor relations with the included express preservation of the right
to strike. 73
It is not questioned that the right to strike is of fundamental
importance. It should not be lightly valued at any time. Yet its suspen-
171 Updegraff, Compulsory Settlement of Public Utility Disputes, 36 IowA L. REv.
61, 64 (1950).
172 Hearsngs on S. 632 Before Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
178 Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Missouri,
374 U.S. 74 (1963).
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sion in any case should not be confused with imposition of involuntary
servitude, which is anathema to all free people. Involuntary servitude
involves denial to the individual of his right to quit his employment
and imposes an obligation of personal service upon him against his
will. The striking employee does not quit his employment. He does not
want to quit. He is interested in combining his efforts with those of
fellow union members to put pressure upon the employer.
If denial of the right to strike and consequently stop utility services
were actually to involve any vestiges of involuntary servitude the
entire subject should be immediately discarded. But mvoluntary ser-
vitude is not involved in striking a balance between conflicting
interests. The question is whether utility employees, usually few in
number when compared with the numbers of people affected by a
strike, should be permitted to inflict loss of light, heat, electric power,
water, transportation and the like upon the community in order to
exert economic pressure on their employer. The possible harmful
ramifications of such economic pressure seem quite disproportionate
to the possible benefits. Continuity of service is more important to the
public than are the contentions of either workers or owners. As a
necessary concomitant to any restrictions upon the right to strike,
however, there must necessarily be included an effective means of
justly deciding questions of wages, hours, and other conditions of em-
ployment.
In giving testimony at a Senate Committee hearing in Washington
in 1959 this writer submitted the thought that
it is indisputable that functions of government are so indispensable
that most extreme measures must be taken to prevent their inter-
ruption. This conclusion rests upon the principle that the welfare
of the people as a whole must be set above the claims or demands of
any included, lesser group of them. This principle seems to apply
with equal logic and force to the functions and services of public
utilities as they are in our time.ii 4
The state's authority to define and to apply its police power is not
questioned where there has been violence, wrongful occupancy of an
employer's property (sit-down strike) or injury to persons (if only
one or a few). The state may limit picketing to a restricted areai 76 and
stop even peaceful picketing after a "context" of previous violence,r"
but the state cannot enjoin a strike which will put out the cooking and
174 Hearings on S. 632 Before Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
175 Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
176 Milk Wagon Dnvers Union v. Meadowmoor Dames, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
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heating fires in tens of thousands of homes; it cannot insist that electric
lights burn, though their extinguishment may mean the closing of
many places of business, darkness in homes and streets, and probably
increased criminal conduct. It cannot require city transit service
though its absence may induce extreme traffic congestion and possible
consequential collisions with greater personal and property damage
than might ensue from many incidents of violence on picket lines.177
Lawmaking always involves the balancing of claims or demands
of competing groups. Outstandingly important as are many of the
claims made by and for the orgaized groups of public utility em-
ployees, should these not be balanced against the needs and claims of
the rest of the public (which inevitably will contain innumerable
members of other umoized groups)? When the competing conten-
tions are all considered should not Congress sustain the vital needs of
the public and give protection to the legitimate demands of the utility
workers as far as they can be protected consistently with public
requirements? Salus populi est suprema lex.
Conclusion
While no one can doubt the ultimate authority of the federal
government under the supremacy clause, some uncertainty must al-
ways exist as to whether the "interpretation" of a federal statute by the
federal courts was less than, more than, or the same as Congress in-
tended.178 Of course, legislative power of correction is ever available,
but an unintended extreme result of any statute, arising from a too broad
judicial interpretation, may have ill consequences unintended by the
legislature for a considerable time before the faulty interpretation can
be remedied. The natural lag of statutory remedies (for social and
economic ills) after the need for the remedies arises is well known.
Hence, an unwelcome or unexpected result of judicially extreme appli-
cation of a federal statute may produce undesirable consequences
for a considerable time before the unwelcome effects become suf-
ficiently conspicuous to move Congress to correct the evils.
These results may follow whether the "interpretation" or applica-
tion by the court creates extreme consequences unintended by the
Congress or sinply operates to disclose unavoidable logical results of
177 See Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Mis-
souri, 374 U.S. 74 (1963); Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Em-
ployees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951). See also Life,
Jan. 14, 1966, p. 32 for some terse comments regarding the recent New York transit
strike.
178 See Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
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what Congress did intend but did not fully treat. In either case,
prompt legislative correction is desirable.
In the present situation, then, we see that the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Wagner Act (and later the Taft-Hartley Act) as re-
quiring a virtually complete preemption of regulatory authority over
labor relations arising from commerce (and the production of goods
as part of commerce) This is seen mainly in the opimons in the Garner,
Laburnum, and Garmon cases.179 The same view was strongly em-
phasized in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board.80 Despite the fact
that Congress, in the Landrum-Griffn Act,'8' clearly indicated the view
of the Court to have been too extreme by reversing its "no man's
land" result, the Court went to a greater extreme in holding the
Missouri public-utilities-anti-strike act to be unenforceable.82 It even
indicated its creation of a new "no man's land" in Garmon.
Depriving the states of normally exercised sovereign powers, to
attain the dubious objective of leaving primary Jurisdiction over public
utility pressure conduct by umons and employers in the NLRB, was
even more extreme than in the uss case, though the legislation which
followed the latter seems to imply a lesson broader than the actual "no
man's land" considered in that situation. Had the Court observed this
it might well have paused before striking down the efforts of the
sovereign states to protect their populations from the drastic effects
of public utility stoppages.
In the recent Stuffed Turkey CasesS the majority concluded that
its previous interpretation of the three judge court statute was "un-
workable." The dissent appeared to agree that the procedure required
by that act was indeed "unworkable and if that fact had "thrown the
lower courts into chaos, a fair case for its demise might be made
out."
8 4
In the present situation relating to labor law and procedure, state
and federal courts, in innumerable instances since Garmon, have re-
fused to decide disputes on the merits and have unhappily explained
that the problem presented was "arguably" one for primary decision
179 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); United
Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1953); Garner v. Teamsters
Umon, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
180 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
is Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519 (1959),
29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60, 164, 186-87, 401-531 (1964).
182 Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Missouri,
374 U.S. 74 (1963).
183 Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
184 Id. at 134 (dissenting opinion).
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by the NLRB. Hence they have, in the cases before them, demed any
possibility of effective decision and have left the litigants to search for
justice elsewhere. But Garmon itself indicates that such decisions
may leave the parties in another "no man's land" for which there is
no remedy if the NLRB in its wisdom declines jurisdiction. How
could the law and the lower courts administering the law be found
in more of an "unworkable chaos"? It seems that by both of the
opinions in the Stuffed Turkey Case, the Supreme Court is unammously
inviting congressional revision of the growing, baffling contradictions
in the field of federal labor law
President Johnson, in his recent State of the Umon message, sug-
gested that Congress should enact "measures which, without im-
properly invading state and local authority, will enable us effectively
to deal with strikes which threaten irreparable damage to the national
interest."185 He no doubt had in mind the New York City transit work
stoppage. It seems not illogical to suggest that in the area of all public
utilities this can be very well accomplished by enacting the return of
adequate authority over such matters to the states. Thus, federal
preemption in this area, probably never fully envisaged by Congress
in all its consequences, would be corrected.
It is, therefore, respectfully suggested that the subject of federal
preemption with respect to labor disputes and the question of the
desirability of a federal code concerning labor relations have early and
extensive consideration by the Congress. Court "fashioning" of laws,
and "litigating elucidation," are too slow and piecemeal to be effective.
The present statutes have, as judicially observed in Garner, left much
authority "to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us
how much."18 6 It may be suggested that Congress define at the earliest
possible time, and as clearly as the subject permits, the limitations of
state and federal powers in the field of labor relations. Congress should
also spell out the primary decisional authority of the NLRB and
proper interim disposition of the "arguable" cases until the Board acts
upon them. Legislative lawmaking can take place in the light of
complete economic and social studies; the "fashioniMg" or "elucidation"
of laws by any court must ever be limited by the narrow issues of the
cases which come by chance (more or less) before it. These may never
add up to a comprehensive code and at times may be but very re-
motely reflective of the congressional intent.
In summation, there appears to have been a movement from
iSS 112 CONG. REc. 130 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1966).
iS6 Garner v. Teamsters Umon, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).
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stateism towards nationalism for at least the last fifty years. That
movement has been much accelerated in the labor law field in recent
years by the judiciary's applying the doctrine of preemption and inter-
preting statutes as delegating to it authority to "fashion" law and to
assume some of the responsibility of the Congress. The national "take-
over" of jurisdiction has advanced far ahead of the fine logical
balancing and protection of all the numerous, complex, and at times
conflicting interests affected. This balancing can only be accomplished
by statute. Congress alone can supply the much needed ordering
process.
